Despite my seriously mixed feelings about the State of the Union speeches, I tuned in to last week’s speech for the first time in several years. Like many, I was disappointed if not surprised that President Obama didn’t mention climate change even once. Climate policy is hard sell in a down economy. I hope Mother Nature understands.

Less disappointing, and less surprising, is that he called for the economy to reduce our oil consumption. I’m sorry to be unimpressed, but when a Texas oil man turned Republican President can bemoan our “addiction” to oil, having anyone else do it seems a little passé.

Though he loses some style points, there is actually some merit in the substance of Obama’s proposal. As if having some actual substance weren’t innovative enough, he went one step further and displayed a remarkable degree of common sense in calling for an end to subsidies to oil companies.

It has long seemed to me, and others, that if we can’t bring ourselves to make oil companies pay for the environmental risks and costs their products impose on us, the least we could do is to stop paying them for the privilege.

So rather than talk vaguely about the need to reduce our oil dependence (as  if we were all just going to stop driving to work and school) or disingenuously about the need to get off foreign oil (as if we could ever produce anywhere near enough oil to make a dent in our dependence on stable global oil markets), the President offered an approach that would at least get us started in the right direction, and if nothing else, would help cut the deficit, something politicians of all stripes could support, right?

One word of warning to the President: Finding these subsidies is a lot harder than you might think.

Not long ago, I helped the nice people at the Environmental Law Institute work on a project to identify and quantify federal subsidies to various energy industries. The end result was a very good report and that nifty graphic to go with it. It turns out that the hardest part of the project was defining what a subsidy is. We wanted to be objective and clear, and to err on the side of being overly conservative. And while the “You know it when you see it” standard would have been much easier to apply, we came up with a working definition that defined a subsidy as a deliberate decision, action or failure to act taken by the federal government that conferred some economic benefit on industry participants that directly and negatively impacted the federal budget. [Update: Somehow I forgot to include that the resulting benefit must not be generally available to all industries, but that was an essential part of the definition.] We measured the subsidy as the size of the budget impact (as opposed to the value conferred on the industry).

Equipped with a solid working definition, we still spent more time than I can remember debating what fit and what didn’t. What we found, which seems obvious in retrospect, is that the vast majority of subsidies don’t come in the form of government payments to industry, but rather the less obvious tweaks and exemptions to various tax laws.

Oddly enough, the largest, and most interesting subsidy to the oil industry that fit our definition was actually a slight change of a few definitions in Saudi Arabian tax law.

If you are an American company that has to pay income taxes to a foreign government, the IRS gives you a tax credit that essentially pretends as though you paid those taxes to the U.S. The idea is actually sound, because it avoids taxing the same corporate income twice. If you make money selling widgets in Canada, and the Canadian government treats those profits as taxable income, even though your company is American, then the IRS won’t make you pay taxes on those profits again.

However, if you have to pay some expenses in a foreign country, even to a foreign government, for operating licenses, for example, the IRS treats those as business expenses, just as it does with other costs of doing business, like labor or materials. In this case, companies can deduct those expenses from their income, reducing the amount of money they have to pay taxes on. With a corporate tax rate of 35%, every dollar a company can deduct from their income saves them 35 cents. As useful as this is, the tax credit is much more valuable, since every dollar of tax credit saves the company a whole dollar in payments.

All of this matters, because in the 1950’s, the Saudi Arabian and other Persian Gulf governments wanted to increase their share of oil revenues from U.S. based oil companies, and were considering raising their royalty payments. Royalty payments are like licensing fees that oil companies pay to the countries they drill in for the right extract the oil. The IRS treats them as a deductible business expense.

The U.S. State Department, eager to keep the Saudi government happy and the oil in the hands of U.S. companies, negotiated a deal whereby the governments would raise their royalty payments the companies had to pay them, but to reclassify them as income taxes. In the end, these governments collected more money from the oil companies, but the oil companies got a dollar-for-dollar reduction in their U.S. tax liabilities, so that the net effect was a reduction in U.S. tax revenues–to the tune of $15 billion total in just the years between 2002 and 2008–while the oil companies themselves came out no worse, or perhaps slightly better off.

I highly recommend reading the whole paper, if only to emphasize the point that, much like the politics of the issue, defining and identifying energy subsidies is a far more convoluted undertaking than the common-sense nature of the issue indicates.

Comments

  1. Scott Schang
    Washington, DC
    February 9, 2011, 11:20 am

    Mr. Comstock:

    Our report’s well-documented decision to treat part of the Foreign Income Tax Credit as a subsidy is something we’ve discussed with you and your colleagues for many hours. We have taken into account your concerns and perspective, and stick by the treatment in our report. When The Economist mischaracterized the entire FITC as a subsidy, we were quick to correct the error. Reasonable people can disagree on how to characterize the FITC; but to say we haven’t addressed this issue simply flies in the face of the considerable time we spent discussing it with you face to face.

  2. Ronald Steenblik
    February 9, 2011, 12:20 pm

    Mr. Comstock -

    I am not a lawyer, so I cannot claim to be an authority on details of WTO jurisprudence. But given that accelerated depreciation (AD) and other tax deferrals were studied by the Informal Group of Experts to the WTO Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures during the late 1990s (without reaching consensus on how to measure them), and that the countervail authorities of many governments also include AD in their purview, my general answer would be: yes, an accelerated-depreciation provision in the tax code can constitute a subsidy. See Section 6.2 of:

    http://www.globalsubsidies.org/files/assets/sub_manual.pdf

    Whether a particular AD provision confers a benefit, and whether it is specific enough to be actionable, depends on the specifics of the case.

  3. Stephen Comstock
    Washington DC
    February 9, 2011, 3:45 pm

    Mr. Steenblik,

    Now I really understand the call for a consistent definition of a subsidy! I will have to read this a bit more carefully and I would appreciate the opportunity to potentially contact you in the future.

  4. Stephen Comstock
    Washington DC
    February 9, 2011, 3:56 pm

    Scott,

    I do remember our discussions. There was general agreement to disagree. However, when the issue is raised and the point highlighted, I see no reason not to open the debate back up – especially if it generates other viewpoints. I am still interested in discussing the economic analysis of my Qatar situation as a US subsidy (i.e. that by economic definition the rate differential is now a subsidy instituted by the US government when the underlying economics on the project or economic decisions to Qatar have already been made), but maybe, as suggested, I am not appropriately using my time looking for such answers.

  5. Stephen Comstock
    Washington, DC
    February 10, 2011, 12:13 am

    Mr. Barrett –

    Thanks for your response, though I am not sure I fully understand the tone of your last note. But, as you intimate, I may be a bit of a pest when trying to understand your points. With that said, you lay out 4 criteria for your position for when the FTC rules account as a subsidy. This is more than was specifically stated in the ELI report, so it is helpful for you to have indicated it so clearly. Though you did not answer my specific question on Qatar, you have left it for me to interpret. If I get it wrong please feel free to correct me.

    Criteria 1) Did the U.S. government take a deliberate action?. Well in the case of Qatar, I would say no. The law in Qatar changed based upon their own soveriegn immunity to do so without any indication from the US that they should or indication that, in doing so, the tax would be creditable (which after reading the ELI report is what you claim happened in Saudi Arabia).

    2) Did that action result in an economic benefit being conferred on a participant in an energy market? Well, since there was no real action, I am not sure how to interpret this other than “no”. There was certainly no benefit one way or the other, again, the economics of the arrangement stay the same.

    3) Did that action also have a direct and negative impact on the federal budget? This is a tough one, but let me put it this way. The US federal rate is 35 % and the Qatari rate is 35% – both before and after. So the rate was fully creditable before and fully creditable after so I would say “no” to this one as well. I guess it would also depend upon whether income associated with Qatari investments are deferred or not, but that maybe a counterfactual issue.

    4) Was the benefit limited to a specific energy industry or set of energy industries? Well I am not sure how paying more tax is beneficial but the tax is likely creditable. Again it was creditablein 2009 when everyone paid 35%, so it should be creditable in 2011. But since the higher rate only applies to oil and gas operations, maybe the answer is “yes”?

    So we have 3 “no” and one “yes” on the Qatar situation. But, since you say that if “the answer to all of these is “yes,” then we concluded that it was a subsidy”, I can only conclude that there is no subsidy in the case of the Qatar under your criteria. Feel free to correct me. Now, since the ELI study, which I did read, lists a number of different countries, I am assuming that you did this same rigorous analysis for each of them or at least some of them in coming up with the position that all of them amount to a situation giving rise to an ecomic subsidy. Or did you assume that a reliance upon a 50 year old situation in a specific country which has been questioned by the very source cited as the reference for such position is enough to address the specific facts in all countries in all cases?

    • James Barrett
      February 11, 2011, 2:26 pm

      Steve- My tone is easy to explain. I don’t believe you are serious about looking for answers to the questions you ask, but rather are trying to create some doubt around the issue by asking them over and over. I don’t have a ton of free time to engage in a conversation with you or anyone else who is not serious about the questions they ask, but I must be willing to admit that I might be wrong. Fortunately for both of us, I still do a fair bit of consulting work on the side. It’s mostly for friends, but I’d be willing to make an exception here, and we could work out a contract with the American Petroleum Institute, or with you personally to answer these questions to your heart’s content. If you leave me a comment here that you’d like to work something out, I’ll know you are serious. Otherwise, I’ll know you’re not.

  6. Richard Raffield
    Florida
    February 11, 2011, 3:19 am

    The big issue is that Obama has already embarked on a full court press to do away with hydrocarbon production and exploration in the USA without the will of the people.

    He lies to America about keeping production on line while finding this green energy. The real truth is that he is already gutting hydrocarbon exploration and intends this tax break to make the use of oil more greatly more expensive to end customers, in particular the American people and small businesses, because he thinks we will use less if the cost in much higher,

    Green energy needs to be explored without destroying the economy. The Obama Administrations approach of not going through congress for approvals of new regulations, by allowing agencies to set their own expansive regulations is an example.

    He is pushing US exploration overseas by not approving permits, getting the EPA to work out a cap and tax scenario.

    Apparently he didn’t learn from 2010. The American people will push him out of office in 2012 at $.500 gas prices. And all this undercover effort and subterfuge will be for naught.

    Perhaps that is why he is moving so slowly in implementation.

    What the Dolts that support this action don’t realize is that this in not really a tax on oil companies because they will pass it own. This becomes another big tax on the American people.

    Americans defied this with Obama Care. Sooner or later most Americans will wake up to what you support and defy you and Obama again.

    • James Barrett
      February 11, 2011, 11:28 am

      Thank you for your comment. Your concern is a little misplaced, however. at $15 billion over 7 years, the FTC subsidy only amounts to about $2.1 billion per year. Since the U.S. consumed about 135 billion gallons of gasoline in 2009, then the absolutely largest impact that eliminating the subsidy could have would be to increase gasoline price by about 1.5 cents per gallon. Cutting the subsidy could never raise prices from their current level of around 3 to your feared $5 per gallon.

      More importantly, not all of FTC translates into prices at the pump, some of it goes to oil companies’ profit, so that gas prices would not rise by the entirety of the reduced credit. And finally, since oil prices are set on a global market, the impact of reducing the FTC on global oil prices and therefore on gasoline prices in the U.S. is significantly diluted by all the other things that are going on in the market.

      In fact, I’d be willing to bet that substantially all of the FTC winds up contributing to oil company profits rather than lowering gasoline prices, although it would be impossible to figure out if I’m right or not.

      But, whatever its impacts on the price of gasoline there is no doubt that the FTC increases the deficit.

  7. Stephen Comstock
    Washington, DC
    February 11, 2011, 4:05 pm

    Mr. Barrett,
    In responding to Mr. Raffield, may I suggest the following as additional consideration of the impacts?
    As I am sure you are aware, the impact of modifying the existing dual capacity rules will be that US based oil and gas companies will face a second level of US taxation when the repatriate their profits. This is something they do not face now when they are obligated to prove the full amounts they pay as taxes are taxes and, due to a deliberate government action inthe 80s to specifically address and restrict this specific concern, they must separately prove they are not disguised royalties – which they are generally able to do. Though you state this is irrelevant in your consideration, I think it allows the FTC to properly work so that there is a credit against US tax for actual foreign tax (rather than disguised royalty) paid on that same foreign income – a point you accept as generally “sound” in your original post.
    So I offer this example to the debate. Assume CNOC and USCo are operating in Iraq. Iraq has a general tax rate of 15% but oil and gas companies pay a 35% tax rate on operations on top of a 10% royalty on production. Under current US tax rules, the two can compete on the same level because they are facing the exact same tax and royalty economics – a point indicating to me and other businesses that the FTC rules are working like they should. Your proposed modification of the US tax rules, though, would dictate that the USCo (and only US-based companies, mind you) would face a residual US tax on the repatriation of Iraqi profits of around 15% (tax effect of deeming the 20% difference in Iraqi tax rates as a royalty on top of the existing royalty) that would force up their effective tax rate on Iraqi operations to around 50%.
    Now, as you have indicated a number of times, I am not an economist. So I might need your expertise to tell me the economic impact on the two competing companies in my example – comparing one that pays a 10% royalty and a 50% tax rate to one that pays a 10% royalty and a 35% tax rate. I think it could certainly mean that Iraqi operations are more valuable to CNOC and other foreign companies than to USCo. It could also, of course, mean that it will be impossible for the USCo to bid on new projects as competitors would an inherent advantage in generating greater IRR and NPVs. This example is not unique to Iraq, by the way.
    As a result, could it force current and future production to entities focused on nationalistic rather than market driven forces? If the answer is “yes”, then is it possible that, like the current situation with hard minerals, markets may be impacted? If the answer is “yes”, then is it possible that Mr. Raffield’s market concerns have some validity? If the answer is “yes” and there are fewer USCos able to operate abroad and generate economic value in the US (through jobs, contractors, dividends, etc) what would be the impact on the deficit? Finally, could this mean that if the modification were adopted – under the criteria you spelled out in your Feb 9th response – the US has given a subsidy to non-US based oil companies?
    I think some of this is addressed in the CERA study (co-authored by Daniel Yergin) from last year.